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Abstract
Since the culmination of the Genocide of 1994, Rwanda has become one of the fastest
growing economies in the world, while also showing great improvements on human
development indicators. This has made Rwanda a brilliant example of post-conflict
reconstruction. At the same time, the nation-state has been led by a single party government
that works under a framework of a nominal multi-party democracy. While a large part of
Rwanda’s post-conflict development has been made possible by the government in power,
this paper argues that Rwanda is developing towards a completely authoritarian state
structure. Development is concentrated in very few regions of the country, votes are
occasionally rigged, large amount of power is concentrated in a few hands, and there is a
constant war that is partly sponsored by Rwanda. All of these factors have a central figure
above them: President Paul Kagame. While the West continues to praise Rwanda for the
remarkable strides it has made on human development indicators and in liberalising its
economy, it fails to ignore the many serious issues that plague the nation-state. Rwanda’s
story of development cannot be sustained if structural changes are not implemented in
Rwanda in the near future.
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Preface and Acknowledgements
I first started taking a serious interest in Rwanda while I was studying as an exchange
student at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. This
interest was spurred by an article on something called developmental authoritarianism in
Ethiopia and Rwanda, published in the journal African Studies. The author, Hilary Matfess,
wrote about the high rates of growth that these states achieved in recent years, while having
an authoritarian state structure. Both these states intrigued me a lot, and I decided to visit
them last year, partly encouraged by cheap flight tickets. Since then, I have closely followed
Rwanda and the incredible changes that have taken place there, and this paper is simply a
detailed and well-researched write-up on what I observed in Rwanda, and the many
inconsistencies in its seemingly amazing developmental story. I do not want this paper to add
to the vast amount of literature that criticises governments in Africa. I simply wish to show
the much more sinister side that Rwanda’s developmental story successfully hides.
Like many things in my life, this paper would only have been possible due to a lot of
help and advice I received from people at Trinity College and outside. Dr Garth Myers has
been my academic advisor since my first year at Trinity. Not only did he inspire me to study
about development in East Africa, he also provided many insights on development policy. Dr
Seth Markle provided me helpful advice on how to address such a complex issue and suggested
many readings for going about this topic. Dr Vijay Prashad’s thoughtful critique of writing
style and structure in parts of this paper shaped the way I write, probably for the rest of my
life. Dr Xiangming Chen’s insights into urbanisation in the global South was critical in shaping
the section on urban development. Others from the Trinity College community include my
fellow classmates and alumni, in no particular order: Tracy Keza, JP Palmer, Serena Seaman,
Sanjay Thapa, Camryn Clark, Paroma Soni, George Denkey, and Kyaw San Min. Many others,
in various institutions, provided me with hours of conversations and debates that shaped the
thoughts that went into writing this paper. These people include, but are not limited to: Yash
Kothari at Boston University, Parikshit Sharma at Bowdoin College, Elias Tuomaala at
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Harvard University, Krish Aurora at SOAS, Guillaume Picard in Buenos Aires, and Aneesa
Khan at College of the Atlantic. Lastly, and certainly not the least, my parents in Mumbai
showed great interest in what I was writing about, and their support and encouragement was
critical in completing this project.

iii

Rayarikar

Table of Contents
Abstract............................................................................................................................................. i
Preface and Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... iv
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Rise of Paul Kagame and Rwanda ....................................................................................... 10
The State is Kagame ......................................................................................................................16
The War in Eastern Congo .......................................................................................................... 24
The War on Journalism ................................................................................................................ 28
The Urban Spectacle ..................................................................................................................... 35
The Corporate Republic of Rwanda ........................................................................................... 49
Conclusion: Rwanda in the Future .............................................................................................. 54
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 57

iv

Rayarikar

Introduction
“A cockroach cannot bring forth a butterfly.” 1 This was the first line of an editorial
published in Kangura, an important monthly newspaper published in Rwanda between 1990
and 1994. This newspaper had ties to Hutu extremists and the National Republican
Movement for Democracy and Development (NRMD), which was the ruling party at that
time in Rwanda. It effectively served as an anti-Tutsi propaganda piece for the NRMD, but
its editors were independent and frequently critical of the NRMD for being too moderate in
dealing with the supposed problem of the Tutsis. Kangura served to play an important role in
creating anti-Tutsi sentiments across Rwanda in the years that immediately preceded the
Rwandan Genocide. The editorial from which the opening sentence is quoted from is one
such example. The “cockroach” was meant to be the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), headed
by the current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame. The RPF was an armed group at that time,
and was fighting to end the violence against Tutsis in Rwanda.
The comparison to a cockroach couldn’t have been further away from the truth. The
RPF’s efforts to rebuild a nation destroyed by genocide are now considered to be an
overwhelming success. This group of so-called “cockroaches” were able to lead Rwanda into
prosperity and turn the devastated nation around into becoming a post-conflict economic
miracle. No other nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, other than exceptions like Mauritius and
Botswana, has seen the same kind of improvement in socioeconomic conditions in such a
short period of time.2 Unlike Botswana and Mauritius, where economies completely changed
after decolonisation, Rwanda’s economic structure has essentially remained the same, and its
primary export is still coffee, as it was two decades ago.

1

‘A Cockroach Cannot Bring Forth a Butterfly’, Kangura, February 1993, 40th edition,
http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/k40r.html.
2
Abdi Ismail Samatar, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in
Botswana Development (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).
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Rebuilding

a

devastated

nation-state after a tragedy of this
scale is extremely hard, if not
entirely impossible. Contrary to
expectations based on other states in
Sub-Saharan

Africa,

the

new

government that took over power
after the genocide managed to
completely turn around from this
situation of destruction, and loss of
human

life

and

capital.

After

bringing the Rwandan Genocide to a
Figure 1: The Rwandan economy has been growing at an extremely high rate
since the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
(World Bank Data, 2016)

quick end, the RPF, with Paul
Kagame’s leadership, gained control

of power in Kigali. They undertook a massive effort to rebuild infrastructure, kick start the
economy, improve socioeconomic conditions, and redevelop social cohesion within the
troubled nation. This period of rapid development continues to this day with the same
intensity. Rwanda has seen great improvements on indicators, and has sustained a GDP
growth rate averaging around 8% per year.3 Figure I shows this dramatic increase clearly.
It is evident that this development took place under the aegis of Kagame and the RPF
under him. It would very likely not have happened if someone else was leading the nation.
Even critics of Kagame in Rwanda cannot deny that their nation has changed for the better.
One of these critics, who also happens to have close ties to senior RPF leadership, said: “In
Kagame, we are lucky to have a visionary and a great leader. No one can say that all of this

3

UNDP, Work for Human Development, Human Development Report 2015 (New York, NY:
United Nations Development Programme, 2015).
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would have been possible without him. Some aspects of life in Rwanda are just much better
than before. No one ever imagined that.”4 Kagame has placed himself at the centre of this
economic miracle. Considering all of this, there seems to be reason enough for Rwanda to be
hailed as a model for development. Kagame and the RPF engaged in recreating the structures
of the state that were destroyed. By ending the genocide and securing Rwanda, the RPF
government ensured their monopoly over the legitimate use of force. 5 The state was
strengthened and civil society was allowed to grow, albeit with some restrictions. Power
became centralised in Kigali and a new constitution was adopted in 2003 to address many of
the shortcomings of previous constitutions of the postcolonial period. An entirely new state
emerged in the ashes of the genocide.
No success story is without its flaws, however. And Rwanda’s is no exception to that
unwritten rule. Some of the issues it now faces have a high potential to scar the muchpublicised image of Rwanda as the poster child of development. Firstly, President Kagame
enjoys almost unhindered power within the government; and the Office of the President plays
an important role in overseeing all activity in the offices, ministries and other institutions that
form the government. Secondly, Rwanda supports a destabilising war in the eastern parts of
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), enabling it to maintain peace internally at
the cost of war in the regional neighbourhood. Thirdly, journalists are constantly targeted in
Rwanda, greatly diminishing the quality of reportage coming from this fast-changing nationstate. Furthermore, urban development in Rwanda is not without its problems: its showcase
capital Kigali displays characteristics of authoritarian planning, while other cities are vastly
underfunded and underdeveloped. Further, Kigali serves as an urban spectacle while
distracting attention from the vastly poorer parts of Rwanda. Lastly, some large business
groups that operate in Rwanda are owned by close associates of the RPF. Since this party is

4

Anonymous interviewee, in conversation with the author, September 2016.
Hans Heinrich Gerth, C. Mills, and Max Weber, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 78.
5
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the ruling party, this blurs the line between the government and the private sector. The rise
of Paul Kagame and his power because of economic growth, along with the merging of the
state with private enterprise, and support for war outside its borders hints towards Rwanda’s
government gradually morphing into a fully authoritarian regime.
I have used a wide variety of literature in this paper. The paper deals with recent
development in Rwanda, and, as a result, many of the sources used are from newspapers from
both Rwanda and abroad since not many large volumes have yet been written on this topic.
There are a few sources, however, that appear more frequently than others in this paper and
are worth reviewing at this stage. Published in 2012, Patricia Crisafulli and Andrea Redmond’s
Rwanda, Inc. is an exciting tale of a new nation-state making massive developmental strides.
As the title of the book suggests, a significant part of this text focusses on the similarities
between Rwanda’s administration and the way in which a corporation is run. 6 This book is
not shy in its praise of Kagame and the RPF government in power. It correctly details many
major developmental milestones Rwanda has achieved under the RPF government of
Kagame. Unfortunately, that is the only accurate part of the book. It is surprising to see that
the book hardly even mentions the countless issues issues that the Rwandan government
faces. Composed of eleven chapters and an introduction, Rwanda, Inc., reads more like a
corporate self help guide than a serious study of Rwanda’s development. Some of the chapter
names that are particularly relevant to argue my point are: “Rwanda’s CEO”, “The Rwanda
Model”, and “Opening the Door to Foreign Direct Investment”. The foreword for this book
is written by Joseph W Saunders, the chairman and CEO of Visa Inc., a corporation with
significant investment in Rwanda. This book is certainly worth a read when studying the
recent changes in Rwanda, since it concisely sums up many of the positive changes that have
taken place there. However, the reader has to be careful with taking this on face value because

6

Patricia Crisafulli and Andrea Redmond, Rwanda, Inc.: How a Devastated Nation Became an
Economic Model for the Developing World, 1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
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of the absolute failure on the part of the authors to highlight the authoritarian aspects of the
RPF government in Rwanda.
A great, detailed, read on just one of the few issues addressed in this paper is Anjan
Sundaram’s Bad News, from 2016.7 This book provides a deep insight into repression of the
media in Rwanda. Sundaram’s experience in Rwanda as a teacher tasked with training the last
independent journalists in the country provided him with a first hand look into the way in
which the RPF tries to supress criticism. Not only are journalists critical of the government
within Rwanda operating under great risk to their lives, some who are abroad also receive
constant threats. Many of those who were trained by Sundaram are now in prison or have
been physically attacked. Despite directly addressing only the issue of media repression, this
book takes a broader look at the authoritarian Rwandan government. Sundaram does not fail
to address the hypocrisy of the West when it comes to Rwanda: the program he taught at was
funded by the British government in order to maintain at least some form of a free press,
while, at the same time, top British politicians embraced the Rwandan development story
and were more than keen to provide any financial assistance to Kagame. This text is a
disturbing eye opener, as Sundaram details the stories of his students who are constantly on
the run to escape from Rwandan government agents.
As mentioned in the preface, an important work that inspired me to study about
Rwanda is Hilary Matfess’ Developmental Authoritarianism and the New Politics of African Strong
Men.8 In this article from 2015, Matfess studies the structure of the state in contemporary
Ethiopia and Rwanda, and argues that in high-growth post-conflict economies like these,
traditional typologies of African states are not applicable. The author suggests a new model
to categorise states, applicable to Ethiopia and Rwanda, called “developmental

7

Anjan Sundaram, Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship, First edition (New York:
Doubleday, 2016).
8
Hilary Matfess, ‘Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental Authoritarianism and the New
Politics of African Strong Men’, African Studies Review 58, no. 02 (September 2015): 181–204,
doi:10.1017/asr.2015.43.
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authoritarianism”. There are five major characteristics of the developmental authoritarian
state. Firstly, a major social rupture brings to power the authoritarian government. In
Ethiopia’s case, this event is the long civil war against the Derg, while in Rwanda, this is the
Genocide of 1994. Second, there are varying degrees of restrictions on free speech and
association. Thirdly, the government has a strong control over the economy, whether directly,
as in Ethiopia, or indirectly, as in Rwanda. Fourthly, there is a militaristic mobilization of
people to aid in the developmental effort. Lastly, the relationship of governments in
developmental authoritarian states with the West is conflictual, and often contradictory.
Both states are recipients of Western developmental aid and support, while being criticized
for their dismal human rights and lack of political freedoms by the West.9 While this article
comes as a refreshing change from the vast amount of literature that singularly characterises
African states as simply being neopatrimonial entities,10 it still uses many of the usual sources
that are used to criticise the Rwandan government, such as the Washington, DC think-tank
Freedom House. Further, Matfess writes in her conclusion that developmental authoritarian
states such as Rwanda will continue to remain authoritarian and will most likely not transition
towards democracy anywhere in the near future. However, Matfess fails to answer clearly why
that will remain the case, instead choosing to solely focus on characterising this new model

9

Matfess, ‘Rwanda and Ethiopia’, 181.
The term neopatrimonialism is derived from Max Weber’s concept of patrimonialism,
where all power in a state is concentrated with a leader and their close associates. This formed a key
part in Weber’s theories of the state in Europe in the late nineteenth-century in many of his writings.
In 1973, Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt published Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern
Neopatrimonialism, a text that described neopatrimonialism as a structure where a traditional
patrimonial system is coopted into a Western-styled bureaucratic administration. Many scholars later
went on to use this term to describe postcolonial states, and blamed neopatrimonialism for the failures
of the state in the global South, especially in Africa. In fact, the term has been overused to describe
all kinds of state failure on the continent, and, consequently, has received lots of criticism for the
term’s inability to accurately capture the diversity of states that is present within the 54 nation-states
present in Africa. Worth mentioning is Swedish-Malawian scholar Thandika Mkandwire’s 2001 article
Thinking about developmental states in Africa, which has a section devoted to the futility of using the term
neopatrimonialism. While this has been the mainstream scholarly thought on states in Africa, I have
decided to include this explanation only in the footnotes because it will not directly add to the story
of Rwanda’s embrace of authoritarianism.
10
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in much more detail. Regardless of these shortcomings, this article succeeds in creating a
viable new model of state structure that is able to address the limitations of the other theories
of the state in Africa that have been prevalent for long.11
While not used much in this paper, an essential read for a background on the
extremely complex origins of the Rwanda Genocide is Mahmood Mamdani’s 2002 volume
When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda.12 Starting in the
colonial pre-colonial period, Mamdani details the ways in which the Hutu and Tutsi identities
were formed over time and ultimately culminated into the genocide. This paper does not go
in-depth into the causes of the genocide, but to truly get a sense of Rwanda’s political history,
this book is mandatory reading. Mamdani’s research on this issue is detailed and unafraid to
write about the the role that Belgian colonial policies played in the creation of a divide
between Hutus and Tutsis. Mamdani also addresses how Rwandan politics in the postcolonial
period was unable to heal the growing gap between the two largest ethnic groups in the
country, while populist rhetoric used by politicians ultimately led to the Genocide of 1994.
Other literature of note that deals with the more specific aspects of this paper includes
Tom Goodfellow and Alyson Smith’s paper titled From Urban Catastrophe to ‘Model’ City?
Politics, Security and Development in Post-conflict Kigali, from 2013. 13 This paper looks at the
transformation of Kigali from being a conflict-torn city to a highly securitised model city. A
major focus of this paper is on the securitisation of the city, and how the image of the city
being safe and secure is crucial for the image of modernity that the RPF government is trying

11

Three relatively recent articles that propagate neopatrimonialism as a cause for the failures
of the state in Africa are Pierre Englebert’s Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic
Development in Tropical Africa (2000), Brandon Kendhammer’s Getting Our Piece of the National Cake:
Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria (2015), and Nicolas van de Walle’s The
Impact of Multi-Party Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (2011). Further details on these can be found in the
bibliography at the end.
12
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in
Rwanda (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
13
Tom Goodfellow and Alyson Smith, ‘From Urban Catastrophe to “Model” City? Politics,
Security and Development in Post-Conflict Kigali’, Urban Studies 50, no. 15 (1 November 2013): 3185–
3202, doi:10.1177/0042098013487776.
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to create. In doing so, the authors argue, the RPF projects the image of modernity over
Rwanda. This paper is critical of the RPF government, and questions the sustainability of the
developmental story of Rwanda. At the same time, the authors acknowledge the rapid
changes for the good that have taken place in Kigali, in particular, and Rwanda, in general.
A major source for anyone wanting to keep up to date with the Rwandan story of
development is the news media. While many large Western media houses have constant
features on Rwanda, the best source for news from Rwanda are local newspapers. Since
Rwanda adopted English as the official language, many newspapers that were published only
in Kinyarwanda are now also available in English. The biggest English-language newspaper in
Rwanda is The New Times. This newspaper is very close the to the RPF and has been criticised
for being RPF owned. In fact, Kagame himself is known to have criticised the newspaper for
its sycophancy to him and his party.14 Despite this major flaw, The New Times can be a fairly
reliable source to keep a track of current events in Rwanda. On the other end of the spectrum
are many Congolese newspapers that regularly publish articles extremely critical of Rwanda’s
government. These would include L’Avenir and Le Congolais, both of which are primarily in
French. Internationally, The Economist, The New York Times, and The Guardian occasionally
publish articles on Rwanda that usually deal with only two themes: issues with elections and
voting, and unbridled praise for some new government initiative.
The tale of Rwanda turning around is one of wonder, as much as it is of fear of what
the future holds for the nation. The shining sun of development in Rwanda forms shadows
that hide a dark side. Economic predictions do show that Rwanda will be continuing on this
trajectory of growth into the future.15 However, simple economic predictions seem to miss
the underlying political and economic factors that are slowly turning the new Rwandan state
to embrace authoritarianism. It is true that this growth will most likely continue; but whether

14

‘President Paul Kagame under Scrutiny’, The Economist, 5 August 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/16750119.
15
IMF, ‘IMF Staff Completes Review Mission to Rwanda (No. 16/151)’ (IMF Communications
Department, 5 April 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pr16151.htm.
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it will ever take place under a government that respects and welcomes different political
opinions, or one that maintains power through the oppression of dissenting political views, is
a matter that is unclear for now. Rwanda, it seems, is developing towards complete
authoritarianism.

9
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The Rise of Paul Kagame and Rwanda
To understand contemporary Rwanda better, it is necessary to know some of the
events that propelled Kagame and the RPF into power. The single most important of these
events is the Rwandan Genocide. The Genocide of 1994 led to the deaths of more than 10%
of the nation’s population, all within a period of exactly one hundred days. This massacre took
place between 7 April and 15 July of that year, and killed around a million people, though
estimate figures range from 800 thousand to 2 million.16 The massive scale and rapid rate of
violence led to a complete destruction of infrastructure and the economy. This violence
permanently damaged the social and cultural fabric of Rwanda. There was nothing in Rwanda
that was not affected by what took place. A whole generation in Rwanda grew up with the
trauma of the genocide. Many saw their friends and family being murdered in front of their
eyes. Others were permanently displaced due to the reckless violence.
The roots of the genocide can be traced back to the era when Rwanda was still a colony
of Belgium. It was during this time that the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis was created
by Belgian pseudoscientists. They worked in a field known as “scientific racism”, which
worked as an easy excuse to justify imperialism and oppression in the early 1900s. Similar
theories have been used all around the world in history, from justifying slavery in the United
States to asserting the dominance of the Aryan race in Nazi Germany. Scientific racism was
a field of study closely related to eugenics, and the Belgians used it to determine that Tutsis
were genetically closer to Caucasians, and therefore, superior to the Hutus.17 This meant that
the Tutsis were now allowed into bureaucratic jobs for the colonial government since they
were “evolved” enough, while the Hutus remained economically marginalised. Along with
access to government jobs, the Tutsis were also favoured when it came to opening businesses

16

Filip Reyntjens, ‘Estimation Du Nombre de Personnes Tuées Au Rwanda En 1994’, ed. Filip
Reyntjens and Stefaan Marysse, L’Afrique Des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 1996-1997, 1997.
17
Edith R. Sanders, ‘The Hamitic Hypothesis; Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective’,
The Journal of African History 10, no. 4 (1969): 521–32.

10

Rayarikar
in cities, leading to a higher concentration of Tutsis in urban areas than was already present.
Historically, before colonisation, the divide between Hutus and Tutsis was entirely an
economic one. The distinction between the two groups was fluid, and it was possible for
someone to change positions based on how much wealth they owned at any time. The
Belgians decided to formalise this difference creating certain parameters for classifying people
into the two groups. Those who owned more than ten heads of cattle were considered to be
Tutsi, while the rest were Hutus. This came to be known as the ten-cow rule.18 By categorising
people into these two permanent groups, the Belgians were able to reaffirm their theory that
the Tutsis were superior, since they were the group that had more economic resources.
By giving preferential treatment to Tutsis over Hutus, the Belgians transformed
identities linked to economic class into those of lineage. Someone whose parents were Tutsi
also became Tutsi by lineage, and not because of how much wealth they had. This created a
small urban elite that inherited a lot of wealth, while a large part of Rwandan society was
marginalised and limited to working in agriculture. It was no surprise, then, that Rwanda’s
first election after independence brought the Hutu supremacist Paramehutu party into
power, which also quickly declared itself as the only legal political party in Rwanda, just like
the NRMD would a few years later. After a long period of political instability and change,
Juvénal Habyarimana’s NRMD came into power in 1978 after a military-led coup d’état.
Just like the Paramehutu, the NRMD leadership also stressed the dominance of Hutus
in the social, political, and economic spheres of Rwanda. Unlike the Paramehutu, however,
the NRMD openly advocated violence against Tutsis, without realising that the Tutsi still
had significant control over economic resources in Rwanda. This led to a massive exodus of
Tutsis into Uganda. They organised to form the RPF, which then invaded Rwanda in 1990 to
start the Rwandan Civil War. The RPF comprised mostly of Rwandans who had fled to
Uganda and had military experience from fighting in the Ugandan Bush War of the 1980s.

18

Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 99.
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The Arusha Accords were signed in 1993 between the RPF and the then Rwandan
government to cease fighting and allow Tutsis to return home from Uganda. 19 However,
extremists within the NRMD, and other groups linked to it, continued the extrajudicial
harassment of Tutsis. When the plane carrying Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart,
Cyprien Ntaryamira, was shot down over Kigali on 7 April, 1994, the RPF was quickly blamed
for it and the massive pogrom against the Tutsis began.
The next 100 days saw all of the violence of the genocide taking place. Tutsis were
being attacked everywhere in Rwanda. Those who were Hutus and sympathised with any
Tutsis were attacked as well. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) was unable to do anything to stop these killings. Despite the repeated requests
from UNAMIR’s commander, the Canadian general Roméo Dallaire, the UN refused to send
any reinforcements to help prevent the catastrophe that would unfold. Dallaire had enough
intelligence to show that a large scale genocide was about to take place. However, the UN
Security Council refused to assist in any way, until it was much too late.20
France was directly involved in the genocide; it assisted Habyarimana’s military with
advanced weaponry and created special training camps that were targeted towards fighting
guerrilla groups like the RPF. A French parliamentary commission report from 1998 that
assessed the role of France in the genocide shows that France sold and gifted the
Habyarimana government a total of 137 million francs worth of armament in the period before
the genocide.21 Another aspect of this involvement was France’s interest in maintaining a
Francophone Rwanda, since that would allow France to assert itself in the Rwandan cultural

19

AB Nyakyi, ‘Letter Dated 23 December 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the
United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General’, 23
December 1993, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB469/docs/DOCUMENT%2017.pdf.
20
Roméo A. Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity
in Rwanda (London: Arrow Books, 2004), 146.
21
Craig Whitney, ‘Panel Finds French Errors in Judgment on Rwanda’, The New York Times,
20
December
1998,
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/20/world/panel-finds-french-errors-injudgment-on-rwanda.html.
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sphere. This would make it easier for France’s neo-colonial ambitions in the East African
region. Since the RPF was formed in Uganda, and most of its leadership spoke English, France
worried that an RPF victory would convert Rwanda into an Anglophone nation. This would
mean that France would lose one of the only French-speaking countries in an overwhelmingly
English-speaking East Africa.22 In 2009, the change that France feared actually took place,
and now Rwanda’s only two official languages are Kinyarwanda and English.23 France also
established a military intervention called Opération Turquoise, that established a safe zone
within Rwanda. This supposed peacekeeping mission was marred by allegations of French
troops instigating violence and protecting those who had been the perpetrators in the killings.
The French mission also rescued Habyarimana’s remaining cabinet and his wife, and sent
them to France for safety.24
On 4 July, the RPF took control over Kigali, though the violence still continued in the
areas to Rwanda’s northwest. Kagame capitalised on the fact that the government troops were
more concerned with trying to kill unarmed Tutsis than they were with fighting the oncoming
RPF forces.25 This is what allowed Kagame and the RPF to take over the whole of Rwanda
fairly quickly even though they lacked the number and the technological superiority that the
government troops had. Immediately after securing the whole of Rwanda, the RPF began to
secure its borders with the then Zaire, where most of the surviving leaders of the genocide
fled. Since Kagame came into power by leading a heavily armed group, his authority was not
challenged by anyone outside the RPF. Within the party, those who did not agree with him
were asked to leave. This massive military victory allowed Kagame to gain easy control over

22
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the state and secure his position within his party. This continues to play a key role in Rwanda
to this day.
What takes place after this is what left everyone surprised. Rwanda changes at a rate
never seen before. Improvements in healthcare are astounding: some health indicators for
Rwanda are even better than most of Western Europe. For instance, the rate of vaccination
against the HPV virus.26 Rwandan educational institutions are slowly becoming regional hubs
for advanced research. Rwanda’s capital and largest urban centre, Kigali, continues to grow
into a city known to have wide avenues, clean streets, and large parks. Kigali managed to
escape from the urban issues that are endemic to most cities in Sub-Saharan Africa: crime,
housing shortage, informal public transportation, and poor infrastructure. 27 This is a big
achievement, considering that this city and the regions surrounding it also saw some of the
most intense fighting between the RPF and government forces during the genocide.
The government has also managed to maintain great relations with aid donors from
around the world, making Rwanda a “donor darling”. This is a term commonly used to refer
to states that receive foreign aid without many conditions being set on them by donors.28 In
Rwanda’s case, this is because of Kagame’s strict oversight over how every little bit of money
is spent to ensure there is no wasteful spending. Not only does Rwanda attract foreign aid, it
also attracts investments of all kinds, as the government pushes towards privatisation. The
government’s plan on rapidly developing the information and communications technology
sector is on track, while foreign technology players have slowly begun to invest in Rwanda.
Most importantly, Rwanda ranks very highly on the Corruption Perception Index, and is
reputed to have a highly functional and efficient bureaucracy.29 These are just some of the
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many aspects of Rwanda’s success story. Accompanying these successes are the serious issues
that pose a risk to undo all of the development that has taken place in Rwanda since the
genocide.
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The State is Kagame
In a conversation I had a few months ago, someone mentioned an incident of a French
tourist arriving at Nairobi’s airport in the 1980s. He was detained for wearing a shirt that read,
“L’etat c’est moi”, a statement that roughly translates to “the state is me”, and has often been
wrongly attributed to Louis XIV. The tourist was detained since it appeared as though his
shirt was criticising the then Kenyan President. At that time, Daniel arap Moi was the
President of Kenya, and was one of the many authoritarian leaders of Africa in the 1980s. Of
course, when some security official who could understand French realised what the shirt said,
the tourist was released without any trouble. The irony here is that at that time in Kenya, the
statement on the French tourist’s shirt actually held true. The state was indeed President
Moi, who towered over any action that the Government of Kenya, or other institutions, took
in those days. In fact, Moi managed to remain in power for an incredibly long period of 24
years, from 1978 to 2002. During this period, Moi strengthened his power and influence over
Kenyan institutions, and entrenched his position in patron-client networks, before being
constitutionally barred from running for another election. He stepped down from his position
without much resistance, surprising everyone by doing so.
In Rwanda, President Paul Kagame plays a similar role in being at the centre of the
Rwandan state. His leadership in the civil war against the previous regime in Rwanda, and his
party’s role in ending the 1994 Genocide automatically put him at the helm of the devastated
nation. Officially, however, Rwanda’s first president after the genocide was another senior
RPF leader, Pasteur Bizimungu. Despite someone else technically being the President of
Rwanda, Kagame was the one with whom all the power was actually concentrated. Bizimungu
resigned in 2000 over dissatisfaction with the way in which Kagame stifled dissent.30 His
resignation meant that the Tutsi-dominated RPF lost its senior-most Hutu leader.
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Just like Moi, Kagame’s government has been accused of stifling opposition on
multiple occasions. The RPF justifies this by claiming that “extremists” can quickly
destabilise Rwanda’s fragile peace that has been so hard to achieve after the genocide. In the
words of Paul Kagame: “Rwandans will not tolerate voices that promote a return to the ethnic
divisionism that precipitated the genocide 18 years ago. To that extent, we place limits on
freedom of expression in a similar way to how much of Europe has made it a crime to deny
the Holocaust. Aside from that, Rwanda is a very open and free country.”31 Unlike Kenya’s
Moi, however, Kagame could not be constitutionally barred from running for President yet
another time. In December 2015, the government held a referendum that could potentially
allow Kagame to remain as the President of Rwanda till 2034. This referendum passed, with
more than 98% of the electorate voting in favour of extending term limits. 32 Even if this
referendum was not rigged, Kagame would likely not have lost. However, his win would
certainly have had a smaller margin. This shows that despite all the negatives, Kagame
continues to enjoy popular support.
The referendum election is not the only election in post-genocide Rwanda that has
bestowed upon Kagame and his allies a huge majority. In fact, every election in Rwanda after
the genocide has seen them win, and by a huge margin. This makes one wonder if it’s merely
good policies and effective governance that made these results possible, or whether there is
indeed systemic suppression of political groups in opposition to Kagame. Adding on this are
signs which point towards vote rigging. The first multi-party elections in Rwanda in 2003, saw
Kagame win 95% of the vote. Journalists have noted that there were certainly instances of
voter intimidation in this election, including soldiers looking over ballots being cast in certain
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districts that Kagame was not expected to win.33 Seven years later, in 2010, when the next
presidential election took place, allegations of suppressing opposition were made yet again.
This time around, the allegations were even more serious. Two out of the three other
contenders in the presidential race were disqualified for not submitting the correct
documentation when registering to run for the election. A senior opposition leader was found
murdered under suspicious circumstances.34 A Rwandan dissident and a critic of Kagame,
General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, was shot while in exile in Johannesburg. He
miraculously survived the attempt on his life, but this led to a period of extremely strained
relations between Rwanda and South Africa.35 “It’s like there’s an invisible eye everywhere,”
claimed opposition party member Alice Muhirwa, in an interview with the New York Times.36
Kagame has certainly acted as a stabilising figure in the period immediately after the
genocide ended and has helped to create a new government and constitution. He also created
a strong and transparent bureaucracy, and focused on maintaining good relations with foreign
assistance donors. Essentially, Kagame became the face of Rwanda to the world. Within
Rwanda, he became the figure that was able to create this new nation that magnificently
rebuilt itself. Kagame’s omnipresence in the lives of Rwandans easily enables him to portray
himself as a visionary and a leader.
One of the ways in which Kagame is able to develop a cult of personality around
himself and the RPF leadership is through the indoctrination of specific groups of people
around the nation in targeted camps, known as the ingando solidarity camps. These camps are
mandatory for all students who have just graduated from high school, and for older Rwandans
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who have been accused of associating with groups that criticise the government or for those
who were involved with the genocide.37 These accusations are often arbitrary, and the accused
are usually Hutu. 38 In an interview I conducted with a student who recently attended an
ingando solidarity camp, I learnt that Kagame views this program to be a vital element in
educating the young in the nation. This student, on the condition of anonymity, told me that
in addition to learning about ethnic unity within Rwanda before colonisation, those who
attend the program learn about the role that the RPF played in liberating Rwanda and
restoring order after the genocide. While the program does not directly extoll Kagame, it
does focus on how the RPF worked tirelessly to bring Rwanda and its development to the
levels it is at now. At the end of the program, Kagame personally presides over a convocation
ceremony for those who successfully complete the program.39
The ingando camps are certainly an easy way in which a large, and mostly young, section
of the society is indoctrinated into believing that the RPF is the only political party that
matters in Rwanda. There is no discussion of other contemporary political groups, especially
not the ones that oppose the RPF. What is really interesting here is that hardly anyone
outside of Rwanda knows of these camps, and finding official information on them is
extremely difficult. I first read about them while scrolling through an old website used by
Human Rights Watch created in the late 1990s or the early 2000s. These camps see
participants engaging in a military style regimen. In fact, some camps have military style
uniforms for their participants, and encourage the participants’ beliefs in Rwandan unity and
patriotism. 40 These camps have been compared to the military camps that the RPF used to
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train recruits in during the early 1990s. Though it is unlikely, considering that most of the
participants are fresh-out-of school teenagers, a Congolese newspaper has also claimed that
these camps served as recruitment grounds for the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group that
operated in Eastern DR Congo.41 This news story quotes an Associated Press report that
describes a few young Rwandans fleeing to Uganda to escape forced conscription through
ingando. However, I was unable to find the original AP report. While it is said that the ingando
camps have not been militaristic in nature in recent years, 42 these camps still play a very
important role in indoctrinating young people in Rwanda and reaffirming the RPF and
Kagame’s position in Rwandan society.
In conversation with scholar Chi Mgbako, a senior RPF leader claimed that the
ingando camps were based on a historical Rwandan concept of local elders leaving the
quotidian world to go into isolation and solve problems of national concern. However, on
deeper examination, she found out that there actually was no strong evidence to suggest that
such a concept ever existed in Rwandan history.43 These camps seem to solely exist for the
purpose of indoctrination, while hiding under the guise of having a historical meaning. One
of the students she interviewed commented, “We were given the right to criticize the
government, but I found nothing to criticize, and students at the ingando I attended never
criticized the tactics of the government. I found that most students were impressed by the
achievements of the current government.” 44 Another former participant interviewed by
Mgbako in 2004 was more critical and clearer on what the purpose of these camps really was:
“Ingando . . . is about RPF political ideology and indoctrination.”45
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Rwanda is unique in that there is certainly a large section of the population that
supports Kagame and the RPF. This is because of tangible economic growth that most
Rwandans have managed to benefit from since the end of the genocide. The critic of the
government whom I’ve quoted before also said, “Even if actually free and fair election were
to be held in Rwanda, Kagame would maintain his majority easily. That’s because most people
have been brainwashed into believing how great his presidency has been.”46 Personally, I saw
an example of this brainwashing in the comments section of an article written in the online
news magazine, Quartz. David Himbara, Kagame’s former economic advisor, wrote, “A
dictator who can’t be questioned; an elite that dominates the economy; and an atmosphere
of anxiety—these are not the formula for economic growth. In Africa as elsewhere, people do
their best work in an environment of freedom, not fear.”47 These concluding lines had a reply
attached to them by a reader who supported Kagame. He accused Himbara: “In the past years
David Himbara has praised the current Rwandan government for it's economic achievements
and now, with his hidden political agenda, he is tarnishing the Rwandan image to justify his
serious mistakes of the past.” I’ve seen similar comments defending Kagame on many online
pieces that are critical of Rwanda. While these comments only represent a small section of
the Rwandan population that has access to the internet, they do show outspoken support for
him and his party. This level of support for Kagame will make systemic change in Rwanda a
difficult process, raising serious questions about its future as a stable state.
Despite these clear flaws, most of which are very well documented, the international
community continues to praise Rwanda and there seems to be no shortage in development
assistance available to Rwanda. One of the reasons for this is clearly the fact that Rwanda’s
record on development is almost spotless in terms of achieving targets. It remains one of the
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few states in Sub-Saharan Africa to have actually managed to meet most of its Millennium
Development Goals. 48 Rwanda has the seen best improvements in infant and maternal
mortality rates, as a result of its effective, but developing, health infrastructure.49 Kagame
uses the Rwandan Government’s reputation of efficiency to demonstrate how a state can be
successfully run. This has earned him many fans, from Bill Clinton to Tony Blair. Another
tactic frequently used by Kagame to let his authoritarian streak not be questioned is bringing
up the West’s inaction during the Rwandan Genocide. The fact that such a large-scale
massacre was taking place in full view of the world, and that hardly anything was done to
control it, does allow Kagame to have less interference in how he runs Rwanda. There were
clear signs that the genocide was about to take place, yet the United Nations or any nations
of the West refused to intervene. This now translates into Kagame being able to effectively
exploit this collective Western guilt about the fact that Western militaries entirely refused
to get involved in ending the violence when they were fully aware what was going on in
Rwanda. This gave Kagame much more leeway than he would have had normally if he had
been President of another nation. When Bill Clinton visited Rwanda in 1998, his speech was
telling of this fact. “We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not
have allowed the refugee camps to become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately
call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.”50
The suppression of opposition shows Kagame’s political dominance, while the ingando
solidarity camps are an example of how he dominates over Rwandan society. These are just
two of the ways in which Kagame has entrenched himself in the daily lives of Rwandans. A
visit to Rwanda would demonstrate this omnipresence even better. I was able to see this on
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my own during a trip to Rwanda. There were many billboards with a picture of Kagame that
had messages about unity and peace, or bumper stickers on most cars that declared the car
owner’s support for either Kagame or the RPF. It was also interesting to see Kagame’s
photographs in all government offices, and even privately owned places, like shops and
restaurants. The New York Times’ Jeffrey Gettleman writes of Kagame’s ability to instil fear
in not only regular Rwandans, but also his close staff members. Kagame is known to
administer beatings on his staff for not following orders exactly as he wanted. At the same
time, most people in the cities and villages of Rwanda refuse to even talk about what they feel
about his presidency. 51 While the lack of any opposition party has certainly made many
miracles on the developmental front possible for Kagame and the RPF, some Rwandans still
live in a state of perpetual fear because of their political opposition to Kagame. This poses a
major challenge for Rwanda’s future, since a large majority of people will never be able to fully
participate in Rwandan politics. This will allow Kagame to gradually expand his power
without any checks and balances and move Rwanda another step closer to authoritarianism.
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The War in Eastern Congo
With the end of the Rwandan Genocide, many of the anti-Tutsi Interhamwe militia
troops, who were backed by the NRMD, were pushed into the eastern parts of Zaire (now
DR Congo) by RPF forces. They were harboured there by the Mobutu Sese Seko government,
extremely infamous for its rampant corruption and lack of interest in running the state.
Wishing to remove the threat of any future risks posed by the Interhamwe génocidaires in
neighbouring Zaire, RPF’s Rwanda obviously wished for regime change in Zaire. However,
little did the RPF know at this time that their planned invasion of Zaire would turn into a
long drawn-out war which would involve the militaries of almost 20 states in Africa. Rwanda
played the largest role in helping form and supporting the Alliance of Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). The AFDL invaded Zaire in 1996 in order to
overthrow the Mobutu government. It was headed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and was
supported by Uganda as well. Uganda’s concerns with Zaire dealt with an armed group known
as the Lord’s Resistance Army that Sese Seko supported through the help of Sudan, and
operated to destabilise Yoweri Museveni’s recently formed government in Uganda.52
After the successful overthrow of Mobutu soon after, the alliance fell apart as Kabila,
the new Congolese president, forced all Rwandan and Ugandan troops to leave DR Congo.
The expulsion of Rwandan and Ugandan troops was not acceptable to either of these two
states, and Rwanda managed to mobilise Congolese Tutsis to take up arms against their
government. Though Rwanda officially states that there are no active Rwandan troops in DR
Congo, numerous reports confirm Rwanda’s active involvement in arming and training rebel
groups formed of Congolese Tutsis. Uganda supported Rwanda in this involvement, and later
began arming its own rebel groups to try and destabilise the Congolese government. It is
unclear what the exact reasons for this aggressive intervention on the part of Rwanda were,
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especially since this was immediately after the genocide and Rwanda’s limited resources could
have been used for much-needed reconstruction within its territory. It is possible that
Kagame perceived a threat of an immediate regrouping and attack from Hutu forces in DR
Congo.53 Another possible reason for this is that this intervention could be a part of a larger
project to create a Greater Rwanda, based on historical borders of the Rwandan kingdom,
before colonisation.54 Rwanda’s, and its ally Uganda’s, role in the war enabled the Congolese
government to portray them as aggressors. This allowed them to get extensive support from
other states in Africa, primarily Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, while Rwanda and Uganda
received mild international criticism. Many armed fringe groups were “adopted” by all sides
involved in the conflict, such as the M23 rebels in the Virunga region of DR Congo that
borders Rwanda. The details of what happened next are equally gruesome, but distract from
the larger story of Rwanda’s movement towards authoritarianism. It is important to know
that in all of this conflict, Rwanda under the RPF played a central role.
A relatively small power struggle spiralled into a massive conflict that is still going on
today and has led to the deaths of at least 3 million people, and displaced many more. Even
more horrifying is the extremely large number of cases of sexual assault being reported in
Eastern DR Congo. Rape was used as a weapon by all parties involved in the conflict. It is
estimated that more than 40% of all women in Eastern DR Congo have experienced sexual
assault since the beginning of the war.55 The intensity of the conflict is much less now, and
the Rwandan and Congolese governments maintain full diplomatic relations. Still, death and
displacement have become a perennial feature of Eastern DR Congo. While Rwanda’s exact
reasons remain unclear and are up for debate, it cannot be denied that Rwanda is an aggressor
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in a long and bloody war that has led to the deaths and displacement of millions of people in
the Great Lakes Region.
One possibility for Rwanda’s involvement in the war is that Rwanda benefits from
exporting minerals that are mined in DR Congo and are secretly slipped through into Rwanda
by RPF backed armed groups. This generates revenue for the RPF, and would explain why
the continuation of this war is essential for Rwanda. While there is no overwhelming evidence
to prove Rwanda’s exact economic benefits from minerals that are mined by workers under
inhumane conditions, there are many allegations against Rwanda on this subject. A study
conducted by an American non-profit shows that the numbers for Rwanda’s mineral mining
capacities and mineral exports simply don’t add up.56 Some of these minerals, such as gold and
coltan, are in high demand in the global economy. Since trade in blood minerals is illegal, any
information on this subject is very hard to find, since the RPF or their buyers will not want
this illegal trade to stop. This is strongest possible reason for Rwanda’s involvement in this
war.
Rwanda’s internal peace and stability comes from being an aggressor in a major conflict
just outside its borders, while militarising inside its borders in the name of maintaining peace.
The Rwandan military is heavily armed, as author Marc H Ellis writes, “…under the guise of
innocence for past suffering.”57 Ellis’ quote here is from an article titled “Is Rwanda the Israel
of Africa?” This is an interesting comparison to make, since Rwanda and Israel are actually
closely linked with one another. Israel is not only a major investor in Rwanda, but Israeli
defence firms are important suppliers to the Rwanda Defence Forces as well. 58 Military
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exercises between Israel and Rwanda have also started taking place. Politically, Kagame and
the RPF use the same language that Israeli politicians use when justifying the use of force and
authoritarian methods of governance, despite evidence that Israeli weapons were used to
carry out the killings during the genocide.59 Recently, Kagame became the first African leader
to speak at the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC),
a powerful pro-Israel lobbying group in the United States, in Washington, DC.60 It is no
surprise, then, that Rwanda and Israel follow similar paths when it comes to intervention and
occupation in the regions immediately outside of their respective territorial borders.
Kagame managed to improve the lives of his citizens, while completely destroying the
lives of others just outside of Rwanda. The previous section explores Paul Kagame’s and the
RPF’s power and dominance over all aspects of life within Rwanda, while this section
demonstrates their powerful presence outside of Rwanda as well. Unfortunately, this has led
to the destruction of the lives of millions in Eastern DR Congo, and forced many to live in an
almost perpetual state of conflict.
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The War on Journalism
This paper opens with a quote from a newspaper called Kangura, which played an
important role in inciting violence during the years that led to the Rwandan Genocide.
Kangura once published an issue with the cover that translated to, “Which weapons are we
going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?”61 Once again, the Tutsi are compared to
cockroaches; this was a comparison commonly used by Kangura. Similar to Kangura, there
were other media outlets in Rwanda during the early 1990s that propagated the message of a
Tutsi-free Rwanda for the Hutus, openly calling for violence on Tutsis. Much like how certain
media outlets in the United States managed to spread hate speech and possibly affect the
results of the 2016 Presidential Elections,62 Rwandan media outlets before the genocide were
able to form a very negative perception of Tutsis within the eyes of some Hutus. Kangura,
however, was nowhere near the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) in contributing
to the genocide. This radio station aired details on where Tutsis were living, and was crucial
inciting people to target them. Journalists in Rwanda were pressured and threatened into
spreading the ideology of the ruling Hutu political class. Those who did not confirm to this
were eliminated. When the genocide began, journalists who were in favour of the RPF or
were against the NRMD were targeted and many were killed. Fast-forward to present day
Rwanda, nothing seems to have changed for journalists other than the ideology of the ruling
party. Journalists are still coerced and threatened into writing in favour of the RPF and the
party’s leadership. 23 years later, the only change is the ideological; journalists have switched
from spreading hatred against Tutsis to spreading the gospel of Rwanda’s peace, modernity
and development.
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The scale at which media outlets were influential in inciting the genocide is actually
tremendous. We shall briefly look at the history of how these media outlets, specifically
Kangura and the RTLM, became influential during this period. At the same time, we need to
consider that the failures of the media were not limited to Rwanda itself when it came to
covering the genocide. Most foreign media outlets barely gave any coverage to the genocide.
Despite facing threats, a few foreign journalists remained in Rwanda, filing stories that would
be destined to appear at the end pages of newspapers. Former New York Times correspondent
Stephen Kinzer writes: “The limited space that most of the world’s media devotes to Africa
was taken up during those days by reports about the inauguration on May 10 of Nelson
Mandela as the new president of South Africa.”63 Choosing between a story of hope in South
Africa, and horror in Rwanda was an unfortunately easy choice for many editors. Further,
events in the United States during this period included the OJ Simpson trial, the suicide of
Kurt Cobain, and the Tonya Harding scandal, all of which involved popular celebrities who
would get more readers, viewers and listeners to media companies. To further prove this
point, a relatively recent New York Daily News article from 2016 lists the major happenings of
1994. This includes news on OJ Simpson, Kurt Cobain, and Tonya Harding, but has no
mention of the Rwandan Genocide. 64 In a way, these companies were also indirectly
responsible for the atrocities of the genocide as their inability to cover Rwanda contributed
to further inaction by the West during this tragedy. Their role is nowhere comparable to that
of Kangura or RTLM, but they cannot be let off without being mentioned.
The name Kangura translated to “Wake Others Up”. This newspaper’s history cannot
be told without explaining another Rwandan newspaper of that era that inspired the name
for Kangura. In 1988, a newspaper called Kanguka was formed in Kigali. It called itself the
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“First Independent Newspaper of Rwanda”. Kanguka was an important newspaper in
criticising the Juvénal Habyarimana led NRMD government. The name Kanguka meant
“Wake Up”. The newspaper never really sided with the RPF, but was sympathetic to their
cause. Since the RPF was viewed as a dangerous and violent organisation, it would have been
politically hard for the editorial board of Kanguka to justify their support for them. They do
often suggest making peace with the RPF, as seen in one of their editorials titled: “Mwahaye
Inkotanyi ibyo zishaka zikaduha amahoro!” This translates to, “Why not give the Inkotanyi
what they want, so that we can have peace?”65 The word “inkotanyi” literally means activists,
but refers here to the RPF. The author of this 1991 editorial piece, Emile Kanamugire, was
later killed in the genocide, along with many other journalists who were known to by
sympathetic to the RPF.66 Kangura was able to emerge because of Kanguka. Neither of these
newspapers were accessible to everyone in Rwanda primarily because of a very low literacy
rate in rural areas. However, that did not prevent the incendiary ideas in Kangura from
spreading quickly and easily in the urban centres.
What also aided Kangura in spreading anti-Tutsi sentiments was the radio station
RTLM. The RTLM was one of the most powerful anti-Tutsi propaganda machine that Hutu
supremacist groups had in their control. Since radios could spread a message to far more
people than a newspaper, it’s crucial to write about the radio as a means of propaganda in
Rwanda. In fact, the radio was called the “eighth great power” in a speech by the Nazi Reich
Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels. 67 Interestingly, in the same speech from 1928,
Goebbels opens by mentioning Napoleon calling the press the seventh great power. During
my research for this paper, I read a lot about the RTLM’s impact in inciting the Rwandan

65

Emile Kanamugire, ‘Mwahaye Inkotanyi Ibyo Zishaka Zikaduha Amahoro!’, Kanguka, 1991,
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/9316/iwacu_pub_kanguka_no48.pdf.
66
Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Reporters sans frontières (Association), and UNESCO, eds., Rwanda,
Les Médias Du Génocide, Collection ‘Hommes et Sociétés’ (Paris: Karthala, 1995), 389.
67
Joseph Goebbels, ‘Der Rundfunk Als Achte Großmacht’, in Signale Der Neuen Zeit. 25
Ausgewählte Reden von Dr. Joseph Goebbels (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1938), 197,
http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb56.htm.

30

Rayarikar
Genocide. However, I did not find anything that really captured the scale of the radio
station’s impact. Recently, I stumbled upon an extremely detailed analysis that measured the
impact of the RTLM in encouraging violence against Tutsis. According to this paper by
Yanagizawa-Drott, approximately 10% of the overall violence during the genocide can be
attributed to the RTLM. This translates to around 51,000 perpetrators of this tragedy being
inspired directly or indirectly by this radio station. 68 This incredible study confirms and
quantifies the role of the media in shaping anti-Tutsi opinion and inciting violence during the
genocide. The severity of the RTLM’s broadcasts was noted during the trials that took place
after the genocide. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda sentenced three of the
founders of RTLM to life imprisonment in 2003 because of their role in perpetrating the
Rwandan Genocide.69
Having being viciously targeted since the group was formed, the RPF leadership that
is in power in Rwanda now has a complex relationship with the media. On paper, it looks like
the Rwandan government has done a lot to foster and train journalists. Since so many
journalists were killed during the genocide, it was especially important for Rwanda to rebuild
the media sector and encourage journalism. On the ground, the reality is much different.
Journalists critical of Kagame’s rule are often arrested, tortured, and imprisoned, even for the
mildest form of criticism. It really is hard to get reportage that can be trusted, especially from
areas far from urban centres like Kigali. While this raises overall questions about the integrity
of media reports from Rwanda, it also points to the authoritarian government that Paul
Kagame presides over.
After the genocide, the RPF worked closely with the West in rebuilding infrastructure
and restarting the economy. Having seen the devastating effects of media on spreading
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violence, the RPF focussed on training and professionalising journalists. Before the genocide,
there was no journalism school in Rwanda. Most journalists were either trained by the media
house they worked for, or went abroad for training. The National University of Rwanda, in
Butare, established a School of Journalism and Communication in 1996.70 Considering that
this was merely two years after a devastating tragedy, the establishment of the journalism
school must have certainly been a priority for the RPF. The school also had a partnership
with a journalism school in Canada, from where faculty members would visit to teach. In 2013,
all the universities in Rwanda were reorganised and merged into the University of Rwanda.71
This was when the School of Journalism and Communication was moved to Kigali, where it
now is located. While this move may have simply been administrative in nature, it also serves
the purpose of allowing the government to keep a closer eye on what is being taught to
Rwanda’s journalists. Apart from having links with Canada, the school has other connections
to the West as well. The school follows a four-year liberal arts program, only really focussing
on journalism in the last two years of studies, not dissimilar to undergraduate study in the
United States. Further, a welcome message on the school’s website from the dean states: “A
number of donors such as the EU and UNESCO have also been so generous to address our
journalism equipment needs as well as capacity building for our staff and students.”72 While
it is unclear how the EU and UNESCO exactly helped the school, it is more than evident that
there is a lot of influence from the West in the way in which it is run.
In addition to the School of Journalism and Communication, there are also other
programs that are funded by the West which aim to improve the quality of journalism in
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Rwanda. This is where we begin to see the cracks in the seemingly normal attempts at reestablishing journalism in Rwanda. Anjan Sundaram, a senior journalist with experience in
reporting in DR Congo came to Rwanda in 2009 for a period of five years to help train and
organise some of the few remaining independent journalists in Rwanda. The program that he
was teaching at was funded by the British government and the European Union. In his book
Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship, Sundaram provides a detailed account of how these
journalists were under attack by the government in Rwanda. He describes many of his
students as having injuries because of torture by the police. His account painstakingly details
the methods used by the RPF to silence journalists who were critical of the government.
Sundaram writes about killings, tortures, secret police, public shaming, and prison sentences
without trial. All of these were tactics used by the Rwandan government to intimidate,
humiliate, and, sometimes, simply eliminate voices that spoke against the RPF’s rhetoric of
development, progress and modernity. The book ends in a rather chilling manner when
Sundaram lists the journalists in Rwanda who were silenced in some form or the other
between 1995 and 2014.73 The author makes it very clear that the twelve-page long list only
includes journalists, and is not exhaustive in any way. There certainly are many more
journalists who have been silenced in Rwanda.
There is another issue that occurs throughout the book. Sundaram constantly
criticises the West for supporting the RPF government. As mentioned before in this paper,
the RPF does receive a lot of support from organisations and governments in North America
and Europe. What is interesting is that in the case of journalistic freedom, the West seems
to support the government by providing assistance to institutions like the School of
Journalism and Communication. At the same time, it provides funding for programs that aim
to organise and train independent journalists critical of the government. Western agencies
seem to be providing funding for two completely contradictory causes. This is certainly not
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the only time that has happened with Western involvement in Rwanda. A 2001 article in the
Telegraph that describes former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the “cheerleader-inchief” for Kagame also writes about two Rwandan exiles living in Britain being warned by the
Metropolitan Police because of an imminent threat on their life.74 These contradictions seem
to have become an essential part of normalising the authoritarian government in Rwanda.
Coming back to the issue of journalists being silenced, a line from a previously cited
article describes the School of Journalism and Communication as being “…a school where
journalists could be moulded into professionals incapable of extreme partisanship…”75 Having
looked at the Rwandan government’s interference in journalism, the above description of the
school seems very far away from the truth. The RPF has effectively gone down the path of
the NRMD when it come to journalistic freedoms. While the language used in Rwandan
media today may not incite violence, journalists certainly face the same kinds of restrictions
and threats that they used to before the genocide. Rwanda’s largest newspaper, the New Times,
seems to have absolutely no content that portrays anyone in the RPF in a negative light.
Earlier in this paper, I quoted a source in Rwanda, who wishes to remain anonymous, claiming
that even if Rwanda had completely free and fair election, Kagame and RPF would still win
because most people are “brainwashed” into believing that his presidency has worked wonders
for the nation. This control over the media is an effective tool in ensuring that “brainwashing”
takes place. This unbelievable level of control points towards the Orwellian state that Rwanda
has quickly turned into.
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The Urban Spectacle
Rwanda has one major international airport, located in Kigali. This rather lavish
airport is surprisingly well connected for a city with only a bit more than a million residents.
In addition to having daily flights to airline hubs on the Africa continent, such as Addis
Ababa, Nairobi and Johannesburg, Kigali International Airport also has direct connections
to many major transit destinations around the world, including Amsterdam, Brussels, Doha,
Dubai, Istanbul, London, and Mumbai. As per 2011 figures, 47.2% of all tourists visiting
Rwanda enter the nation from this airport, and this number has been growing steadily as the
airport gets better connections.76 For almost half of all tourists entering Rwanda, the airport
is their first experience in Rwanda. On the road to the city centre from the airport, one cannot
help but notice the futuristic looking buildings that are spread around Kigali, especially the
massive dome of the Kigali Convention Centre. For such a small city, Kigali seems to have
many feathers in its cap.
The US$300 million Kigali Convention Centre is not the only structure in Kigali that
draws a second look.77 The Paediatric Cancer Centre, designed by renowned architect David
Adjaye is expected to be complete later this year, on a massive suburban site to the south of
the city. The recently opened Marriot Hotel is a massive structure that dwarfs the older Kigali
Serena Hotel. There is construction taking place everywhere, and new projects get built
quickly. In Rwanda Inc., a book about Rwanda’s post-conflict rise, the authors describe these
changes at the very beginning of the book: “There is a joke among residents and frequent
visitors to Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda, that if you blink twice, you will see a building
that wasn’t there just the other day. What seems like pure exaggeration became a reality for
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us over numerous trips made to this tiny landlocked country in eastern Africa. Each time we
arrived, there was something else to see.” 78 Kigali has become the sign of Rwanda’s
transformation. It is the place where Rwanda defies its bloody past, and projects an image of
modernity and progress into the future. It is Rwanda’s urban spectacle, but it is also a
distraction: it distracts one away into believing the flawless story of Rwanda’s development.
Before the Rwandan Genocide, Kigali could not really be described as being a
spectacular city. In fact, for a long time in its history, it was very small. A section of the
Natural History Museum in Kigali shows old images from the city’s past and juxtaposes them
with images of modern day Kigali. The contrast is not only striking, but also shows just how
many more people there are living in Kigali right now. Areas that were completely barren in
the old photographs now are full of houses, shops and streets. Hills covered with forests now
have apartment complexes built on them. While census data isn’t available at regular intervals
until the 1990s, it is clear to see that
Kigali’s

population

has

grown

exponentially in the period after the
genocide, as shown in Figure 2. In
addition to being the centre of the
Rwandan

economy,

Kigali

also

served as a place that was relatively
safe to live in during most of
Rwanda’s post colonial history.
At the turn of the twentieth
century, Kigali was a small village
with no more than a few hundred
Figure 2: The population of Kigali only began to grow after independence, but
saw drastic increases in the period after the Rwandan Genocide.
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2015)
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there were 357 inhabitants in 1907.79 There was nothing special about Kigali when compared
to any of the thousands of other villages and towns in Rwanda. An interesting figure by the
name of Doctor Richard Kandt arrived in the village of Kigali in 1907. He was, at that time,
the German colonial resident in Rwanda, a position given to the senior most colonial official
in the colony. His story is central to Kigali’s establishment as a capital city.
Despite being born into a Polish family, Kandt was an important part of German
society and practised as a doctor in Bavaria. Fascinated by the writings of other European
colonists in Africa, he spent some years studying Kiswahili in Berlin, before deciding to leave
Europe. Like many other European travellers in the continent at that time, Kandt arrived in
Africa to find the source of the River Nile. His ship reached Dar es Salaam in modern day
Tanzania in 1897, then a part of German East Africa. He went towards the West from Dar es
Salaam in his search for the source of the Nile, and eventually reached what is now Rwanda.
On his way, he also met the King of Rwanda in the monarchy’s capital in Nyanza.80 Kandt
claims to have found the source of the Nile in the Nyungwe Forest, which now is a large
conserved area in southern Rwanda.81 He lived for four years near this location, in a small
village that he called “Bergfrieben”, or “Peaceful Mountain” in German. In 1902, he returned
to Germany and impressed German government officials by his work. After he published a
book about his journey in 1904, he was officially appointed as the colonial resident.82
Kandt was sent back to Rwanda in 1905. This time he went to establish a colonial
administration office. While it is unclear whether he arrived in 1906 or 1907, Kandt set up a
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small German base in Kigali with minimal staff in that period.83 Since people from Rwanda
were not dependent on employment at the administration centre, this did not contribute to
a growth in the population of the city, which was really a village at that time. During this time,
he also promoted planting coffee in Rwanda, which continues to be the largest export from
Rwanda today.84 Kandt returned to Germany in 1913, one year before the start of the Great
War in Europe in which he would eventually die. He served as a doctor in the German
military, and suffered gas poisoning on the Eastern Front against Russia in 1917. One year
later, complications from the poisoning developed into tuberculosis to which he would
succumb. Kandt died in April 1918 in Nuremberg at the age of 50.85 Keeping in mind that
Russia only minimally used chemical weapons in the war, it is very possible that Kandt died
because of accidentally being poisoned by German chemical weapons.
While Kandt was fighting in Europe, the Belgians had invaded Rwanda from Congo
in 1916, as a part of their East Africa offensive. Having very few German colonial officials, and
almost no military presence, Belgium had no issues in taking over Rwanda quickly. After the
end of the Great War, the Treaty of Versailles formally ceded Rwanda to Belgium as a part
of Ruanda-Urundi, a combined territory that used to be the north-western corner of German
East Africa. Further, Article 22 of the treaty classifies Ruanda-Urundi it as a Class B Mandate
territory under the League of Nations, which meant that Belgium would have to develop this
territory to the point it can become independent.86 This development never took place, and
Belgium merely used this colony to extract resources, primarily the coffee that Richard Kandt
introduced to Rwanda.
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For Kigali, the Belgian takeover meant that it would no longer remain a centre of
administration. The Belgian colonial administration was headquartered in Bujumbura (then
called Usumbura), which now is the capital of Burundi. However, the administrative centre
for the Rwanda part of the Belgian Mandate was in Butare in southern Rwanda. The Belgians
renamed the town to Astrida, in honour of Queen Astrid of Belgium. The name would change
back to Butare after Rwanda’s independence in 1962. Butare was chosen as a site for the
administration centre because it was close to Bujumbura, the colonial capital, and Nyanza,
the capital of the Rwandan monarchy which was the traditional centre of power. The Belgians
had a much larger presence in the colony than the Germans, partly justified by the League of
Nations mandate requiring Belgium to build a system of administration that could then be
handed down to the Rwandans on their subsequent independence. This meant that even a
regional colonial office, like the one Kigali would have a larger number of employees, both
Rwandans and Europeans. A 1945 survey shows that the population of Kigali was 6,000.87
Clearly, the city had grown after Belgian colonial takeover.
The next time Kigali’s population was counted was more than a decade after Rwanda’s
independence, when Kigali officially became the capital of independent Rwanda. The 1978
National Census shows that Kigali’s population was 143,175.88 This is a massive change over a
period of 33 years. Assuming the census data is mostly correct, this translates to a population
growth rate of 9.95% per year during this period. Over the next few decades, this rate of
growth continues to get bigger, as can be seen in the chart in the beginning of this section
(Figure 2). More recent data shows that 28.9% of Kigali’s population is comprised of people
who moved in to the city in the last 5 years, firmly establishing Kigali as Rwanda’s largest city
and economic centre.89 There are not as many push factors that cause this migration as there
are pull factors.
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The praise that present-day Kigali receives is unequivocal in comparison to any other
capital city in Sub-Saharan Africa. Kigali is widely known to be a very clean city, as having
many forests and green spaces, there’s also a massive arts scene in Kigali that has grown since
the genocide. Plastic bags are not allowed anywhere in Rwanda, though a small black market
of plastic bags is emerging.90 On the last Saturday of every month, most Rwandans, including
Kagame, come together in their local communities and collectively take part in community
improvement activities that are known as umuganda.91 Usually, this involves work like planting
trees and cleaning up the neighbourhood. All of this contributes towards Kigali’s image of
modernity. As a city that has very few attractions of importance for tourists, Kigali has
worked towards changing that image as well. Promoting its arts, culture, excellent museums,
and great food, the city is certainly getting more interest by tourists. For long, the main tourist
attraction in the city was the Genocide Memorial, a place for remembrance of the horrific
past. Now, as times change, Kigali is attracting more tourists and, more importantly, jobs in
the tourism industry. There are even short tourist guides to Kigali now, which show that
Rwanda’s fast changing capital has a lot to offer.92 Partly due to a low supply of hotel rooms,
but also because Kigali is a relatively expensive place for tourists, nightly room prices in a
standard luxury hotel in Kigali start at around US$230 per night, same as they would for a
comparable room and hotel in cities like New York or London.
Modern Kigali is the brainchild of the RPF and Kagame. After the devastation of the
genocide, the RPF had a chance to rebuild it from scratch. Having being given an almost clean
slate to work on, every policy decision made about Kigali allows the RPF to project its power
90

Émile Clavel, ‘Think You Can’t Live without Plastic Bags? Consider This: Rwanda Did It’,
The
Guardian,
15
February
2014,
Online
edition,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/15/rwanda-banned-plastic-bags-so-can-we.
91
Eugene Kwibuka, ‘Umuganda Is Essential to Our Development, Kagame Says’, The New
Times, 1 November 2015, Online edition, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-1101/194003/.
92
Kit Buchan, ‘Rwanda Reborn: Kigali’s Culture, Heart and Soul’, The Guardian, 11 April 2014,
Online edition, sec. Travel, https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/apr/11/rwanda-kigali-rebornculture-heart-soul.

40

Rayarikar
and ideology over Rwanda. This led to the creation of the urban spectacle: this beautiful and
clean city that is not only great to live in, but also has many amazing things to see and do. The
spectacle is enhanced when Kigali is compared to capital cities of Rwanda’s neighbours. An
often recurring characteristic feature of these other capitals is that they are undisciplined,
while Kigali has often been described as disciplined. Interestingly, this is a word that was also
used to explain why the RPF was able to prevail and take over power during the genocide.93
This discipline is made possible through deliberate control exerted over the city by the party
in order to completely dictate how the urban spectacle is created and managed. This control
by the RPF manifests itself in one important form: control over the space and built
environment. Consequences of controlling space make it easy to indirectly control the place
as well. Simplifying from geographer Edward Relph’s seminal work Place and Placelessness, space
in this context means the physical built environment, while place refers to the meaning
ascribed to that space.94
This section has many examples of how the space of Kigali is controlled by the RPF.
The clean roads, the green spaces, the futuristic buildings all serve to show that Rwanda is
progressing rapidly. Some of these are merely symbols, having very little practical utility for
most Rwandans. One such example is the previously mentioned Kigali Convention Centre,
which is estimated to be the most expensive building to be built on the African continent, far
outstripping the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in Egypt that was built at a cost of US$220 million.95
Symbolisms aside, there are more direct ways in dictating the built environment. Kigali has a
very strict zoning plan, and has an online system that is required to be used by anyone who
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wishes to get a construction permit. The zoning codes are incredibly detailed and have
restrictions on everything imaginable, including rules on what paint to be used on a perimeter
wall, and how big the numbering outside a house could be. 96 After ensuring that their
construction plan fits the zoning code, a developer in Kigali has to get a construction permit
that controls the construction process that sets out what materials to use in the construction
and what the best practices would be. This long-winded process effectively means that any
new construction in Kigali follows a plan built according to the RPF’s vision. To make this
story even more interesting from here, it is important to mention that the largest construction
companies that are registered in Rwanda are owned by holdings firms that are closely
connected to the RPF. This will be looked at in more detail in the next section.
Space is not simply controlled by new construction in an urban area. Controlling space
also involves destruction. Some, such as geographer David Harvey, go so far as to say that
modernity is, “always about ‘creative destruction,’ be it of the gentle and democratic, or the
revolutionary, traumatic, and authoritarian kind.”97 The same Natural History Museum in
Kigali that has images juxtaposing the old and new Kigali to show the city’s growth, also has
images that show how populated areas of the city were systematically depopulated during this
growth that Rwanda has been experiencing. Many central areas of Kigali had a large number
of people living in informal settlements. Obviously, these settlements would contradict the
image that the RPF would have wanted its modern city to be associated with. The quick
solution was to move thousands of people to the periphery of the city and provide them with
cheap government built housing, while depriving them of the centrality that their previous
homes had.98
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Yet another way in which space is controlled is through securitisation. This is a very
broad concept that can take manifest in various ways. When I arrived in Kigali in April 2016,
it was right on the day that marked the 22nd anniversary of the beginning of the Rwandan
Genocide. 22 years after the genocide, I was surprised to see a very large number of armed
military troops deployed all along the streets of Kigali. They were not marching, nor were
they deployed to stop any rally or event, and neither was there any important VIP movement
that needed to be protected. They were simply there to intimidate anyone who could
potentially cause an issue on the day commemorating the genocide. At the same time, the
Rwandan National Police was carrying out its routine roles: controlling traffic, stopping cars
that were speeding, and guiding foreigners like me to the correct bus. I never thought
seriously about this until recently, when I read Tom Goodfellow and Allyson Smith’s excellent
paper on the securitisation of Kigali, which will be discussed soon.99 On another front, Kigali
has been deploying CCTV cameras in many locations around the city to help curb crime in a
city that is already known for its low crime rate. These cameras came into the spotlight when,
in 2011, a woman was caught stealing US$400 at the Kigali International Airport. She was
able to get convicted simply because of the cameras that were installed there.100 After this
news was reported, many wrote to their local newspapers expressing their support for
installing more cameras and how they can be useful in ensuring that crime levels remain low
in Kigali. One of the letters even goes as far to hint that CCTV cameras are a prerequisite for
Kigali to become one of the “developed cities like Moscow and Tokyo…”101
The link between controlling space and controlling place is a bit complex. The seeming
modernity of Kigali that is manifested through its built environment builds certain emotions
in the minds of those who live and work there. The structures that the RPF built in Kigali
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help in imposing its power and show that the party is indispensable for modernity to be
achieved in Rwanda. In simpler terms, when someone likes the space and the built
environment of Kigali, they also validate the RPF being in control because modern Kigali is
built by the party. In that sense, the control over place is a consequence of the control over
space. The deployment of armed troops is another way in which the space is controlled. And
it has its effects over place as well, in that it gives the impression that Kigali is a very safe
place. The authors of Rwanda Inc., for instance, seem to have absolutely no issues with all the
military deployment in Kigali. In fact, they welcome it, as they write about how gun toting
troops on street corners signify safety and security.102 Goodfellow and Smith, more critically,
write about the many ways in which Kigali is securitised in order to enable the RPF to
“achieve the secure and orderly development it considers so central to its development
objectives and political survival.”103 More importantly, they show how place is affected by
securitisation, when they mention that the processes of securitisation “effectively limit the
capacity for urban groups to organise in ways that might be politically more threatening to
the government.”104
Now that we have established how controlling space effectively also means controlling
place, we need to rewind a bit to clearly see how this is connected to the creation of the urban
spectacle. The control that the RPF has over the city’s space and place is key in ensuring
discipline in the city’s population and urban form. When the RPF is able to take credit for
ensuring discipline, a quality that the RPF values, it can then claim to be the force behind the
city’s modernity and the urban spectacle. When compared to cities like Nairobi, Dar es
Salaam, or Bujumbura, Kigali stands out as being this disciplined city that could be “tamed”
only by the RPF. When that link is made, it is clear to see how Kigali serves to become an
urban spectacle made only possible because of the efforts of the RPF.
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One important factor that helped the RPF in creating the urban spectacle of Kigali is
the city’s urban primacy. Primacy refers to the ratio by which the largest city in a region is
larger than the next largest city. In the case of Rwanda, Kigali is around 16 times larger than
Butare, the second largest city. Kigali’s population falls at around 1.3 million, while the
population of Butare is around 85 thousand residents.105 This means that compared to any
other part of Rwanda, Kigali is disproportionately the centre of economic activity. This also
explains why so many people want to move to Kigali. The primacy makes it easier for the
RPF to simply focus all investment in and around Kigali while mostly ignoring the rest of
Rwanda. This helps enhance the status of Kigali as the urban spectacle, while distracting away
from the many issues that face the rest Rwanda.
Butare, Rwanda’s second largest city, and the former Belgian colonial capital is far away
from Kigali when it comes being a modern city. In fact, compared to Kigali, it seems world
behind. When I visited in April 2016, I saw only one paved road in the city, and other than a
small market and a few shops, economic activity seemed to be primarily centred around
agriculture and the University of Rwanda campus. It seems untouched by the story of
development and modernity that the RPF likes to spread to the world. Considering that the
second largest city in Rwanda is in this shape, smaller cities will probably be even worse off.
Kigali’s ability to dominate over the rest of Rwanda means that Rwanda’s development has
been very uneven. An interesting comparison can be made here. Chen writes about China’s
urban hierarchy in which he describes that urban development in China has been fairly equal
within cities of each region in China. This happened despite certain cities being pushed by
the Chinese government towards liberalisation. While there are differences in between
regions, there is not one city that is developing faster than the others within a region with the
exception of Shanghai.106 In Rwanda, that is far from the case. This is, in part, because the
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governments in power before the genocide did not focus on ensuring equal urban
development in all parts of Rwanda, causing Kigali to grow disproportionately larger.
However, even to this day, this focus on Kigali continues under the RPF.
This can be clearly seen in official statistics published by the National Institute of
Statistics of Rwanda. While Rwanda’s total poverty rate for 2011 was at 44.9%, Kigali’s
poverty rate was only 16.8%. 63.8% of houses in Kigali had a cement floor or better, while the
same figure for Rwanda as a whole is far away at 21.1%. Almost three quarters of Kigali’s
households of have access to electricity at 73.3%, while only 19.8% of Rwanda as a whole has
access to electricity.107 Similar discrepancies continue on most quality of living and poverty
indicators that are available, showing that development in Kigali is merely a spectacle and is
not representative of Rwanda as a whole. Other figures show that almost half of all banking
activity in Rwanda takes place in Kigali (80-90%), while the city only has 11% percent of
Rwanda’s population.108 Another report shows that 63% of all industrial activity in Rwanda is
located in and around Kigali. 109 What do the Kigali Special Economic Zone, the swanky
Innovation City, Africa’s largest solar power plant, and the only railway station in Rwanda
that is under construction, have in common? They are all located in Kigali. While Kigali’s
master plans show spaces being set aside for a new airport and bus rapid transit (BRT) lanes,
the rest of Rwanda does not have any form of public transit. Interestingly, the consulting
company that produced the master plans and zoning codes for Kigali is called Surbana Jurong,
which is owned by Temasek Holdings of the Government of Singapore. Rwanda, an
authoritarian state that is a multi-party democracy in theory, plans its urban development
with the help of a company that is owned by Singapore, another authoritarian state that is a
supposed to be a multi-party democracy in theory.
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Creating modern cities that are meant to be spectacles is not something unique to
Rwanda. This is, in fact, something very frequently used by authoritarian regimes. One of
Harvey’s most important works, Paris, Capital of Modernity, is about the creation of the
modern city of Paris by the authoritarian regime of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte. Here
modernity is brought to Paris to further authoritarianism. From creating wide roads for
facilitating the movement of troops, to building a massive basilica (Basilique du Sacré-Cœur)
to assert the power of the Catholic Church over the bloody yet hopeful history of the
Communards of Paris, the city’s modern form is a manifestation of authoritarian repression
of people.110 Similarly, the massive Nazi Party rally grounds outside Nuremberg created a
spectacle of Nazi modernity, with its awe inspiring halls and fields, and the manner in which
the audience was assembled in an extremely orderly fashion. Italy and Spain also have similar
architecture built in the period of the early 1930s to the middle of 1940s under fascist rule.
All of these aimed to create an image of modernity, while reinforcing the idea of a nation
making progress. This took place with the backdrop of atrocities on those who did not
confirm to this authoritarian modernity. What the RPF is doing in Kigali is not different.
The RPF’s strategy to promote Kigali seems to be working well for now. Those who
are strongly in favour of agglomeration economies will probably also be fine with the primacy
of Kigali. At this point, however, it must be noted that the rest of Rwanda is far behind Kigali
on most development indicators. Kigali, in itself, cannot develop its services and industries
after a point if it cannot find a market in the rest of Rwanda. The urban spectacle of Kigali
may make the RPF’s story of development and modernity seem like a reality, but it hides the
truth that the rest of Rwanda, with most of the population, is far away from being anything
close to Kigali. Yes, Kigali was naturally poised to be an economic centre because it was the
largest city when Kagame and the RPF took over. However, instead of working towards
addressing the disparities between Kigali and the rest of Rwanda, the RPF moved towards
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rapidly urbanising and investing in Kigali which simply heightened development in the city at
the cost of the rest of the nation. Kigali can remain the modern capital, but the RPF will pay
a heavy price for ignoring the rest of Rwanda.
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The Corporate Republic of Rwanda
Since the genocide, Rwanda has been portrayed as the perfect model of embracing
liberal economics in the global South. In fact, in conversations with journalists, Kagame has
“demonstrated his passion for private-sector development, free markets, and capitalism.”111
The government has often been compared to a large private firm, with Kagame being its
CEO. It is unsurprising that the lines between the government and the private sector get a
bit blurred when the government is functioning like a large company. But it does get more
interesting when parts of the government, specifically the RPF, actively intervene in the
private sector of Rwanda. This happens while the RPF tries to pass off as a noninterventionist party. This intervention that takes place is not through direct government
policy, but through RPF owned private companies that operate in Rwanda. This should
justifiably lead one to question whether Kagame is indeed passionate about the private sector
and the free market or not.
The way in which Kagame runs the government is through heavy control over all senior
bureaucrats and ministers. There is absolutely no tolerance for corruption in Rwanda, and
Kagame is known to have sent some of his closest allies to jail for being involved in corruption.
From Kagame’s viewpoint, corruption has a “devastating effect on building trust and
legitimacy in government.”112 This plays an important part in portraying Rwanda as a business
friendly place. On being asked why he chose to invest in Rwanda, Chaim Motzen, the cofounder of an Israeli solar-power firm, said, “Rwanda has an excellent business environment
– no corruption – and that played a role.” 113 In addition, Kagame oversees a system of
performance targets for government bodies, known as imihigo. All governmental bodies in
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Rwanda, from ministries to local rural governments, have to sign a contract with the Office
of the President to achieve specific goals every year based on performance indicators. These
performance indicators usually measure social and economic development. The governmental
bodies are allowed to set their own targets for their contracts, giving them the freedom to
work based on their circumstances.114 This allows the government to keep track of what it is
doing well and what it is not. However, not surprisingly, it also gives Kagame direct control
over smaller governmental bodies that should technically not be directly reporting to the
Office of the President. Rwanda is indeed run like a large firm, and it does seem appropriate
to compare Kagame to a CEO. In fact, some people do just that. The chairman of the Private
Sector Federation of Rwanda, Faustin Mbundu has said, “We call him the CEO of
Rwanda…He runs the country like a business.”115 What remains to be seen is whether actual
private firms are really free to do business in Rwanda.
In addition to having a CEO-like grip over the government, Kagame has a close group
of advisors that he has personally appointed. This group, known as the Presidential Advisory
Council (PAC), was formed in 2007 to assist Kagame in policy formation, not unlike a board
of directors in a company. The PAC meets twice a year, once in Kigali and once in New York.
The members of this group include both Rwandans and foreigners who have had significant
experience in working in Rwanda. While Crisafulli and Redmond write that this group
comprises of experts in all fields that concern Rwanda’s development, most of the foreign
members of this group they mention are actually only business leaders who head firms that
are involved in a variety of different sectors ranging from education to pharmaceuticals to
finance. 116 Many of them have investments or financial interests in Rwanda, which could
certainly affect the advise they provide to President Kagame due to conflicts of interest.
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There is indeed some level of diversity in the PAC, but a large number of its members are
simply involved in business and do not have any experience in policy formation. If this group
does play as big a role as is claimed in helping form Rwanda’s policy, the Rwandan government
may soon simply become an extension of the private sector and start forming policies that
only stand to benefit businesses and foreign investors.
When it comes to benefiting domestic businesses, however, we do not need to look
into the future. A closer look at some of the largest companies operating in Rwanda today
reveals an interesting pattern: the RPF controls a majority of shares in various holding
companies, most prominent of them being Crystal Ventures Limited (CVL). CVL’s diverse
portfolio ranges from infrastructure to aviation to financial services, in both Rwanda and
abroad. CVL was originally a part of the RPF’s Production Unit which worked to secure
donations for reconstruction, and now acts as the party’s investment arm.117 The RPF-led
government clearly prefers CVL owned companies to work in certain sectors of the economy,
while choosing to completely liberalise markets in others. 118 The basis by which the RPF
decides whether to get involved in a certain sector of the economy or not is obviously not
publicly available. However, by simply looking at CVL’s portfolio, I noticed that the
companies that CVL owns are usually those that can make a large profit without needing
much reliance on achieving economies of scale, such as infrastructure. The other holding
company that the RPF owns, called Horizon Group, also similarly invests in the infrastructure
and construction sector. As expected, the websites for either CVL or the Horizon Group do
not mention anything about their links to the RPF. Large state-owned holdings companies
from other parts of the world, like Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, do not seem to have any
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concerns with openly associating with the government. Could this be indicative of the fact
that Rwanda’s government has something to hide?
CVL has been criticised for going against the government’s pro-liberalisation strategy,
because even though it is technically a private firm, it is practically controlled by the Rwandan
government. Crisafulli and Redmond argue that, in fact, RPF-owned businesses like CVL
invested in certain sectors when no one else would, to be able to attract other investments.119
They demonstrate this through an example of CVL’s temporary partnership with MTN, a
South African mobile service provider, to set up Rwanda’s first mobile network, called
Rwandacell. A few years after setting up this company, CVL simply sold their stake and left
the market. The reason for leaving the market was supposed to be the fact that Rwanda’s
mobile network market had become robust enough to attract new investments. Behuria
argues that the CVL’s primary goal is only to generate profit for the RPF. Cases like
Rwandacell, where the RPF invests to create a market, are exceptions rather than the norm.120
The role of RPF-linked business groups not only serves to further capitalist
development in Rwanda, but also strengthens the power that the RPF has in controlling the
economy. Further, it allows the RPF to operate under the facade of being a government that
encourages economic liberalisation and privatisation. This greatly helps it in attracting
foreign donors and positive attention of the liberal presses. The Italian fascist leader,
Mussolini, has been misquoted as having said, “Fascism should more properly be called
corporatism, since it is the merger of state and corporate power.” 121 There is no written
evidence of him ever having said that, and there are doubts on whether this is exactly how the
translation to English would look like, since certain words do not translate very well from
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Italian. What is important in this context, however, is that Rwanda and CVL do seem to fit
that misquoted definition of fascism. The state and corporate power go hand in hand in
Rwanda, and that gives a great deal of leverage to the RPF over the economy of Rwanda.
As mentioned above, there may be some marginal benefit in the RPF’s control over
these companies, in the form of encouraging investments. However, the fact is that the profits
go to RPF, a political party, and not the Government of Rwanda’s treasury. From a certain
perspective, the RPF makes money at the cost of the Rwandan taxpayer since the profits
earned by private holding firms like CVL, could have instead gone to a parastatal that would
have been owned by the Government of Rwanda, and not a political party. In addition to
diminishing Rwanda’s rhetoric of being friendly to the market, this should also raise questions
on whether Rwanda’s high rankings on the Corruption Perception Index are justified since
the government’s decisions probably are in the interest of benefiting the RPF linked
companies. More recently, Rwanda has once again been ranked second in Africa in the World
Bank’s Doing Business 2017 report, a close second to Mauritius. In the global rankings,
Rwanda is ahead of Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, which are four of the five states
that comprise the BRICS.122 According to the methodology used for generating the rankings
for the report, states that have a better rank usually have lower regulations and no government
intervention in the free market. In Rwanda’s case the part about the lack of government
intervention does not really hold true. One can only assume that there is a bias in favour of
Rwanda in the World Bank, because of its “open to investments” stance, and the fact that its
government is known for working very efficiently. Even when claiming to foster capitalist
development and the free market, Kagame’s Rwanda fails by having indirect economic
intervention in the Rwanda, allowing the RPF greater control over the economy that what is
possible through pushing for government policies.
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Conclusion: Rwanda in the Future
Rwanda’s growth has amazed everyone. It is indeed a major feat that the RPF was able
to accomplish. However, there are very clear flaws in which this development has taken place.
While it is hard to deny that the lives of most Rwandans have improved tremendously for the
better, this growth cannot be said to be sustainable. The biggest risk that Rwanda faces is the
high likelihood of a succession conflict after Paul Kagame dies, unless he willingly steps down
as a president. Kagame needs to gradually start letting go of the power that he has
concentrated with him to ensure that a proper succession takes place once he is no longer the
President, whether he steps down willingly or dies. Kagame and Rwanda have all the resources
to start de-concentrating power and strengthen governmental institutions to work
independently. The RPF and the state are almost synonymous, because of the RPF’s complete
domination over the Rwandan political sphere, and Kagame has the ability to change this in
his capacity as the President of Rwanda.
To many Rwandans, Kagame is a liberator who has delivered on his promise of a
better, stronger nation to them. To many Congolese, he’s a foreign invader who has kept a
war going on for decades and led to the deaths of millions. As power gets concentrated in the
hands of the President, the likelihood of Kagame’s successor being able to effectively use it
becomes less plausible. Worse still, the likelihood that Kagame abuses his powers for personal
gain grows massively as well, as systems of checks and balances get dismantled. The
referendum to allow for Kagame to run for more terms as a President has been criticised all
over the world, and certainly within some circles in Rwanda as well, and for a good reason.
Kagame’s centrality to Rwanda might also become this developing nation-state’s downfall in
the near future.
The instability that Rwanda has created across the border in DR Congo, will
ultimately strain Rwanda’s resources and deal a lot of damage to its currently spotless
international reputation. This is already affecting development assistance from abroad, with
the United States marginally reducing military aid to Rwanda because of its involvement in
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DR Congo. 123 If this continues, it will force Kagame and the RPF to adopt even more
authoritarian measures within Rwanda to deal with a sustained loss of capital, investments,
and international support. Related to that is the question of whether the Congolese war
changes perceptions of Rwanda for foreign investors and aid donors. If that does happen, no
amount of PR campaigns will help the Rwanda salvage its reputation as a business friendly
destination for investments, unless Rwanda is able to do what states like Israel have done:
skilfully manage their international reputation while hide war and oppression at home.
More important now than ever before, the press in Rwanda has been reduced to a few
media outlets that completely toe the line of the RPF. Journalists and media houses that dare
to speak against the RPF or Kagame are swiftly taken down through a variety of methods.
The most common method for this involves physically and verbally threatening journalists
and their families. While some level of criticism by the media is allowed, and even encouraged,
many journalists live in fear for their lives for exposing incongruences in what the government
says and what actually happens on the ground. This lack of criticism aimed at the government
allows for many of the other atrocities that the RPF is involved in to go unnoticed and
unquestioned. In the future, this will have a negative impact on Rwanda’s currently spotless
global image as investors and aid donors realise that many events that put Rwanda in a
negative light are not even being reported on at all.
As development in Rwanda becomes increasingly concentrated in and around Kigali,
most of Rwanda’s population that lives outside of the capital still survives in high poverty
levels. Even physical infrastructure outside of Kigali is in poor shape, and this provides for a
stark contrast to the gleaming modern city that Kigali has become. There are obviously no
fancy airports and tall buildings outside of the city, but nor is there adequate electrification
or sanitation infrastructure. Rwanda’s development story is actually only a development story
for Kigali. The city essentially serves as a large urban spectacle that overshadows the lack of
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development in the rest of Rwanda. How will this small nation-state continue its remarkable
progress if it ignores an overwhelming majority of its population?
Rwanda’s image of embracing capitalism is not clean either. Rwanda is far from having
anything resembling a free market, despite what the World Bank or the Rwandan government
strongly assert from time to time. My own concern here is not that there is no free market
present, as much as it is that the market is used to drastically expand the RPF’s control over
Rwanda and its economy. Additionally, business groups like CVL, that are backed by the
government, get preferential contracts to execute projects that play a role in the Rwandan
development story. Instead of being publicly owned entities, these companies have close ties
with the RPF and by giving contracts to these companies the leadership of the RPF essentially
pays itself and their associates. The RPF not only exerts almost complete control over the
Rwandan economy, its actions also amount to corruption and nepotism.
Rwanda’s institutions are weak without the President’s support, and the development
of its people is limited to certain areas only. It will be wrong to assert that sustainable
development is impossible under an authoritarian government like the one in Rwanda.
However, the presence of an authoritarian government does allow for certain policies and
decisions to take place that may not be in the interests of everyone. Especially interesting in
the future will be Kagame’s next 7-year term as President of Rwanda. He is expected to win
the 2017 Presidential Elections, and his next term will be a litmus test to determine whether
Rwanda’s success story is indeed a model to be emulated, or whether Rwanda has been turning
into a completely authoritarian regime all this while, masquerading to be a multi-party
democracy. If the current trajectory of events continues, as demonstrated here, Rwanda’s
embrace of authoritarianism will lead to complete disorder within Rwanda and the larger
Great Lakes Region of Africa.
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